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Finally, it has been recommended that each case be determined as
it arises. Policy, statutory and historic law would combine to either
preclude or permit litigation.' 8
CONCLUSIONS
The DiGirolamo decision, in its total reliance upon the statutes
in question, adhered to Pennsylvania's longstanding acceptance of
a traditional position in respect to the interspousal immunity
doctrine. Its analysis, however, which neither questioned the fic-
tional conceptualistic unity of spouses nor inquired into the policy
reasons underlying its existence, failed to take into account many
of the issues that are raised by a contemporary challenge to the
doctrine.
The rationales which have long supported the doctrine are begin-
ning to lose their acceptance. The fictional unity theory, and with
it the immunity doctrine, is now being frequently rejected. 0 The
underpinnings of the policy arguments that secured the rule are
slowly being eroded by changes in the social fabric of American
society. Novel arguments are being advanced by judges and com-
mentators to circumvent longstanding precedent upholding the
rule. Nevertheless, DiGirolamo would seem to indicate that change
in this doctrine in Pennsylvania must come from the legislature or
not at all.
DAvm SCHMITT
CRIMINAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SCOPE
OF SEARCH-The United States Supreme Court has held that a
search incident to a valid arrest for a traffic violation is not limited
108. 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 183 (1971).
Thus, when presented with an interspousal suit, a court must determine whether there
are factors present that warrant the imposition of the immunity doctrine. If no such
factors are found, one spouse can sue the other.
Id. at 186.
109. The number of states that have abolished the doctrine is rapidly approaching, if it
has not already passed, twenty-five. The following are some of the states that have limited
or abolished the rule:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin.
Vol. 13: 174
Recent Decisions
to a frisk of the arrestee's outer clothing; the custodial arrest itself
gives rise to the authority for a full search, regardless of whether
there exists either further evidence of the crime or a belief by the
arresting officer that the arrestee is armed or dangerous.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
On April 19, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks of the District of Colum-
bia Metropolitan Police Department made a routine spot check of
the defendant's vehicle. When asked to do so, Robinson produced a
temporary driver's permit, the vehicle registration, and a selective
service classification card. The officer made a note of the discrep-
ancy between birth dates on the draft card and permit, returned the
items to the defendant, and permitted him to continue on his way.
Jenks later found that the defendant's operator's license had been
revoked and that the application for the driver's permit had con-
tained a fictitious birth date. When Jenks observed the defendant
driving the same vehicle four days later, the officer signaled him to
stop, intending to arrest him for operating a vehicle after revocation
of his operator's permit' and for obtaining a permit by misrepresen-
tation.2 The defendant produced the same temporary permit, and
Jenks placed him under arrest. After advising Robinson of his
rights, Jenks conducted a "field-type search," patting down the
defendant while standing face to face with him.' Jenks felt an object
in the left breast pocket of the defendant's coat4 and removed a
crumpled cigarette package containing gelatin capsules. Later
chemical analysis confirmed Jenks' belief that the capsules con-
tained heroin.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-302(d) (1967). This provision carries a fine of $100 to $500, or
imprisonment from 30 days to one year, or both.
2. Traffic Regulations of the District of Columbia § 157(e). A violator is subject to pun-
ishment by a fine of not more than $300 or 10 days in jail.
3. Since operating a vehicle after suspension or revocation of an operator's license is an
offense for which an officer is permitted to make a summary arrest, a full field search incident
to the arrest was required before the defendant could be transferred to the station for booking.
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department General Order 3, April 24, 1959.
4. A defense witness who was a passenger in the car at the time of the arrest testified that
Robinson's coat was on the back seat of the car when the defendant alighted from the vehicle,
and that the coat was removed and searched by Jenks after he placed Robinson under arrest.
The defendant testified that he had loaned the coat to a friend who had placed it in the car,
that the coat had been out of his control, and that he had not again gained possession of it
until the time of the search. The jury, apparently, discounted this testimony.
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The defendant's motion to suppress5 was denied, and the heroin
was admitted into evidence. Robinson was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for possession and
facilitation of concealment of heroin.6 On appeal, the case was re-
manded to the district court to determine whether the search vio-
lated the defendant's fourth amendment rights.7 The district court
found no violation; Robinson again appealed to the court of appeals,
which reversed the conviction.8 Certiorari was granted, and the case
was set for argument in the United States Supreme Court with
Gustafson v. Florida,9 in which the permissible scope of a search
incident to a custodial arrest for a traffic violation was also at issue.
The court of appeals based its opinion upon its interpretation of
the permissible scope of a search as discussed by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.10 Recognizing the need for ade-
quate protection of police officers while performing their duties, the
Supreme Court in Terry attempted to balance this interest with
fourth amendment guarantees." The Court held that searches of
5. The motion to suppress was based on two arguments: First, demand and presentment
of Robinson's driver's permit satisfied the purpose of Officer Jenks' "spot check." The officer
had no right to demand the showing of a draft card. To the extent, then, that the draft card
originally gave Jenks cause for suspicion, the arrest and subsequent seizure of the narcotics
were forbidden fruit and, thus, inadmissable as evidence. Second, there was no proof of an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized heroin. Both contentions were originally rejected by
the district court; the chain of custody was stipulated to at the trial.
6. The convictions were obtained under Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 570;
Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1147, § 8, 68 Stat. 1004; Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat.
550 (These laws were repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970)).
7. United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). In a special
evidentiary inquiry, the court sought clarification of the following: (1) whether the search was
potentially justifiable by means of the "plain view" doctrine; (2) whether there existed any
evidentiary purpose for the search; (3) whether Jenks had continued to search the defendant
following the discovery of the heroin and, if so, to what extent; and, (4) whether the search
was within Metropolitan Police Department guidelines.
8. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
9. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). A Florida municipal police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle
after having observed him weave repeatedly across the center line of the road. The defendant
was placed under arrest for failure to have his operator's license in his possession. Incident
to the arrest, the defendant was "patted down." At the completion of the patdown, the officer
placed his hand in Gustafson's coat pocket, removed a cigarette box, opened it, and found
marijuana. Gustafson's conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana was reversed on ap-
peal. The search was held to be violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, Gustafson
v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, 258
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972), and certiorari was granted, 410 U.S. 982 (1973).
10. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides:
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persons stopped for purely investigative purposes were permissible
only in those instances where the officer reasonably believed that
the person he had stopped was both armed and presently danger-
ous.' 2 The Court warned that such a search must be restricted in
scope. Only searches necessary to discover weapons which might be
used to harm the officer would be permitted. The court of appeals
construed the Terry "scope of permissible search" inquiry to apply
to searches incident to lawful arrests, as well as to Teriy-type street
encounters.' 3 Thus, to justify the search of the defendant in
Robinson, the court reasoned, Jenks' search must have been
" 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible."'"
In support of its position, the appellate court cited the Supreme
Court's recent application in Chimel v. California" of the "scope
limitation principle."' 6 Applying that standard, the court of appeals
sought to determine what constituted a justifiable basis for an inci-
dental search. The Court in Chimel had justified the search by the
need to seize weapons, or objects which could be used as weapons,
in order to prevent an escape or assault upon the arresting officer.
An additional justification was the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence. However, the Court disallowed the search, finding that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
12. 392 U.S. at 30.
13. In Terry the officer detained three suspects on the street and conducted investigative
searches of their persons. Although there was no probable cause to believe that a crime had
been or would be committed, the Court held that the officer's belief that the suspects were
dangerous was reasonable, and that a search limited to a patdown for weapons was permissi-
ble.
14. 471 F.2d at 1093, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969).
15. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. In Chimel, police officers, armed with a warrant for the defendant's arrest for bur-
glary, were admitted into his home by his wife. When the defendant returned, he was placed
under arrest. Despite his refusal to consent to a search, the officers searched the entire home
on the basis of the lawful arrest. Items seized were admitted over the defendant's objection
that they had been unconstitutionally obtained. Chimel's conviction was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court, People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1968). Although the court agreed that the warrant was invalid, it held that the arrest was
lawful, since probable cause for the arrest existed even in the absence of an arrest warrant.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arrest itself had not warranted
the scope of the search actually conducted. The scope must be limited to that for which there
exists a constitutionally justified basis.
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the search had exceeded its permissible scope.
Judge Wright, speaking for the court of appeals in the instant
case, applied the Terry holding in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Sibron v. New York,' 7 a companion case also involving
the proper limits of an investigative search. 8 Wright felt that each
factual situation should be reviewed according to its own circum-
stances. For crimes where evidence potentially" exists on the person
arrested," the "search incident" exception to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement 0 provides a reasonable basis for a
search of the person of the arrestee. The officer may, at the same
time, search for weapons. In factual situations such as the present
one, where no evidentiary purpose could be served by the search, the
court did not believe an officer is to be granted the same leeway."
Where the officer's sole concern is for his safety, a reasonable suspi-
cion of the presence of a weapon must be the basis for an incidental
search. The arrest itself cannot provide that basis. The court re-
marked that the physical risk to the officer is created by the circum-
17. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
18. Sibron involved an officer's seizure of narcotics from the pocket of the defendant.
Several hours prior to the search, the officer had observed the defendant in conversation with
six or eight known narcotic users. At the suppression hearing it was found that probable cause
existed for the arrest. The search was upheld as incident to a valid arrest, and defendant was
convicted.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Finding that no probable cause had existed
prior to the search, the Court reasoned that the search could not be justified as incident to a
lawful arrest. In the absence of a belief that Sibron was presently armed and dangerous, the
Court found no adequate grounds to support a search for weapons. Even had there been such
justification, the officer failed to "pat down" the defendant for weapons before inserting his
hand into the defendant's pocket.
19. In the instant case, since Robinson had been observed driving the vehicle, there was
no additional evidence needed to convict him for operating a motor vehicle after revocation
of his operator's permit. At one point in the proceeding, the government did suggest a possible
evidentiary purpose. Notices of permit revocation are normally sent to those whose licenses
have been revoked. If Robinson had such a notice in his possession, it would have indicated
a knowing commission of the crime. By reason of his review of Robinson's traffic record, Jenks
knew that the notice had been sent to the defendant over five years before this arrest. Any
chance that Robinson had the notice in his possession was highly remote.
20. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Yet no one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a
valid arrest. The right to search the person incident to arrest always has been recog-
nized in this country and in England.
Id. at 60. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
21. Arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics are exceptions to the
general rule that no evidentiary purpose is to be served by the search of a traffic violator.
471 F.2d at 1094 n.16.
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stances of the detention rather than by the "niceties of the law of
arrest. "22
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and
upheld the district court's conviction. 3 Justice Rehnquist, speaking
for the majority,24 spoke initially of a search incident to a lawful
arrest25 as a traditional exception to the warrant requirement.26 The
arresting officer has unqualified authority to conduct searches of
both the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's control
at the time of arrest.2" Those searches, Rehnquist concluded, im-
pliedly satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonable-
ness. 
2
The Court then sought to determine whether the Robinson search
had exceeded the scope necessary to accomplish legitimate govern-
mental objectives. 9 As the Court in Terry stated, the manner in
which the search was conducted was as much at issue in terms of
reasonableness as was the presence of a warrant."0 The Robinson
majority distinguished the street-encounter frisk from the Robinson
case. Terry and Sibron dealt with a permissible "frisk" for investi-
gative purposes based upon less than probable cause, while the
search conducted by Officer Jenks was performed incident to an
arrest and, therefore, with probable cause .3 The Court thus refused
22. Id. at 1096, citing People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 204, 496 P.2d 1205, 1218,
101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 850 (1972) (en banc).
23. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
24. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, White, Stewart, and Blackmun joined Jus-
tice Rehnquist to comprise the majority.
25. There was no contention that the arrest was without probable cause and therefore
unlawful.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. 414 U.S. at 224-26.
28. Many commentators have discussed the relationship between the reasonableness
clause and the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Scholars have long questioned
whether: (1) a search conducted with a warrant on probable cause can be unreasonable; and
(2) whether a search without both a warrant and probable cause can be reasonable. See
generally Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IOWA L. REv.
1093, 1101 (1967); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CraM. L.C.
& P.S. 393, 397-98 (1963); Note, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 667 (1961).
29. Legitimate governmental objectives include seizure of: (1) fruits of the crime; (2)
instruments used to commit the crime; (3) weapons which could be used to place the arresting
officer in danger or to aid an escape; (4) contraband, the possession of which is a crime; and
(5) any material which is evidence that the arrestee has committed the crime. Amador-
Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. 392 U.S. at 28.
31. The Court in Terry also distinguished the purpose, character, and extent of the two
types of searches.
1974
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to apply those stop and frisk limitations to a probable cause arrest.
The majority also expressed its disagreement with the court of
appeals' suggestion that each factual situation be reviewed to deter-
mine whether there existed authority for a search incident to the
arrest. A police officer's determination, the Court felt, is necessarily
a "quick ad hoc judgment""2 which the fourth amendment does not
require to be analyzed in detail. Such a case-by-case adjudication
was not supported by historical practice in either this country or
England.3 No precedent was cited for this assertion. The majority
believed that the authority to conduct an incidental search is not
dependent upon a court's later determination of the probability that
weapons or fruits of the crime would have been found upon the
person of the suspect. Instead, the Court held that a custodial arrest
based upon probable cause will fully justify any incidental search.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Douglas, analyzed the search in three phases: the original
patdown of the defendant's coat pocket; the removal of the cigarette
package; and the opening of that package. Since the patdown had
been conducted pursuant to an in-custody arrest, there was no ques-
tion of its validity.m With regard to the second phase, however,
Marshall believed the removal of the unknown object from the de-
fendant's pocket to be an unwarranted extension of Terry's scope-
of-frisk, since Officer Jenks had testified at the suppression hearing
that he had not suspected the object was a weapon.3 Even assum-
ing, as the majority found, that the removal of the package was
reasonable within fourth amendment guidelines, Marshall felt that
there was no justification for the officer's opening of the package."
32. 414 U.S. at 235.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 250.
35. An object cannot be removed from a suspect's pocket unless the officer reasonably
believes it to be a dangerous weapon. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968); ALl
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 110.2(4) (Proposed Official Draft No. 1,
1972).
Even if Jenks had believed the object to be a weapon, it is questionable whether such a
belief would have been upheld as reasonable. The testimony of an instructor at the District
of Columbia Police Training Division indicated that police trainees are instructed that ob-
jects such as a wadded-up cigarette package ordinarily should not be removed from the pocket
of a frisked suspect.
36. 414 U.S. at 255-56. The sole purpose to be served by the removal of weapons from a
suspect or arrestee is the prevention of either an escape or infliction of harm upon the officer.
If the officer believes that an object may contain a weapon, that purpose can be fully served
by placing the object beyond the reach of the suspect. There seems to be no need to examine
the contents of the object.
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The majority, however, chose not to discuss the opening of the ciga-
rette pack as a search in its own right.
Marshall also objected strenuously to the majority's rejection of
a case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of the arresting
officer's decision to search. He cited this form of review as perhaps
the most basic of fundamental fourth amendment principles. The
majority's fear of overruling the "quick ad hoc judgment," he be-
lieved, was in direct conflict with the very function of the amend-
ment-to insure that such judgments by police officers are subject
to review and control by the judiciary. 3 Although the requirement
of prior judicial approval of a search may be bypassed in certain
situations, Marshall argued that those searches should not be ex-
cused from a later judicial determination as to their reasonable-
ness.3" He also took exception to the majority's willingness to accept
the police department order that a full search is to be conducted
during an in-custody arrest. To accept that approach, he remarked,
would be to accept that which the Supreme Court had specifically
rejected in Sibron.5
Marshall also challenged the practical application of the major-
ity's rejection of a case-by-case adjudication. Although Officer
Jenks was required by police department regulations to make an in-
custody arrest for traffic violations such as Robinson's, 0 in most
jurisdictions it is within the discretion of the officer to either make
an arrest or to merely issue a citation. Since the granting of such
discretionary powers also provides an opportunity for an officer to
use a traffic arrest as a pretext for conducting a search," a case-by-
case determination would provide a safeguard against potential
abuse. Marshall reasoned that situations may now occur under the
majority's approach where the legitimacy of the basis for arrest
itself may be subject to judicial review, but the reasonableness of
the officer's search for weapons may not.
37. Id. at 241-42. See Johnson v. United States, 330 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1943).
38. 414 U.S. at 243.
39. The Court in Sibron concluded:
Our constitutional inquiry would not be furthered here by an attempt to pronounce
judgment on the words of the statute. We must confine our review instead to the
reasonableness of the search and seizures which underlies these two convictions.
392 U.S. at 62.
40. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department General Order 3, April 24, 1959, required Offi-
cer Jenks to arrest and take custody of Robinson.
41. See, e.g., Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
1974
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Subject to a handfull of well-delineated exceptions, the Supreme
Court has held that searches conducted without prior approval by
a judicial officer are per se unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. 2 In Amos v. United States,"3 the Supreme Court allowed
valid consent as a proper waiver of one's fourth amendment rights.
The Court held in Warden v. Hayden" that neither a warrantless
entry into a home nor the ensuing search for a suspect and weapons
was invalid when the police had been in "hot pursuit" of the sus-
pect. Carroll v. United States45 provided another exception to the
warrant requirement permitting a warrantless search of an automo-
bile on the grounds that it could be removed from the jurisdiction
before a warrant could be obtained. A search of a person and place
incident to a lawful arrest is a further exception."
Whether the arrest itself or the actual presence of evidence of the
crime is the traditional basis for an officer's right to search," the
arrest alone does not permit the officer to determine the type or
extent of the search.48 As held by the Court in Terry, the reasonable-
ness of such a search is still dependent upon whether the search was
justified when made and whether its scope was properly limited by
the circumstances. 9 When a person has been arrested for a crime
for which there exists either evidence or instrumentalities of the
crime, there is reason to believe that the arrestee will have them on
his person. It is far more difficult to show reasonableness when, as
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
44. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
45. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
46. See note 20 suipra.
47. Early legal commentators, discussing the seizure of evidence pursuant to an in-
custody arrest remarked that:
[Ijf by hue and cry a man was captured when he was still in seisin of his crime-if
was still holding the gorey k nife or driving away the stolen beasts-he could not be
heard to say that he was innocent ....
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF COMMON LAW 577 (1895). This passage has
prompted some to believe that it was the actual presence of evidence of the crime rather than
the arrest itself which provided a proper basis for seizure; see Note, Searches of the Person
Incident to Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1969). Courts in this country have chosen instead
to interpret these words as supporting an incidental search pursuant to arrest. See, e.g.,
People v. Chiagles. 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). Such an interpretation is contradicted
by both 10 HAISBURY'S THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 356 (3rd ed. V. Simonds 1955) and early English
case law; see Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245 (1887); Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim.
Cas. 29 (1853).
48. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
49. 392 U.S. at 19-20.
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in Robinson, there is no direct relationship between the criminal
behavior (a traffic violation) and the articles seized pursuant to that
arrest (heroin).
The Supreme Court first spoke of the permissibility of warrantless
searches incident to a valid arrest by way of dictum in Weeks v.
United States.0 There, the permissible scope was defined as the
arrestee's person. The Court later extended the breadth of the
search to cover articles located within the person's control.5 Shortly
thereafter, though again by way of dictum, the Court in Agnello v.
United States52 further extended the scope to include the place of
arrest. In the years following that decision, the Supreme Court in-
termittently both widened and narrowed this scope. 3
The approach to this problem suggested and adopted by the court
of appeals and the dissenting. Supreme Court justices would restrict
the scope of a search to that necessary for protective or evidentiary
purposes. In so doing, the Terry guidelines for "stop and frisk"
would be applied to those searches arising from and incident to an
arrest where no further evidentiary purpose exists. In such cases,
removal of an object from the pocket of an arrestee could only follow
an officer's detection of the object's presence by means of a pat-
down. Further, there must be a reasonable basis for believing that
the object is indeed a weapon.
Those opposed to this view will argue that such a restrictive scope
50. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the defendant sought and obtained the return of
personal possessions police officers had removed from his home following an arrest at his place
of employment. The search was made without a warrant and without the defendant's consent.
51. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upheld search which produced contra-
band liquor found while the defendant was operating his automobile).
52. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The defendant was arrested several blocks from his home. Narcotic
agents conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's home. The Court, citing Carroll and
Weeks, upheld the search at the place of arrest but refused to extent its validity to a site other
than that of the arrest.
53. Among those cases broadening the permissible scope are United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950) ("reasonableness" used to determine permissible scope); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (permissible scope extended from articles within physicafcontrol
to those within constructive possession); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (search
of arrestee's premises and seizure of items not mentioned in warrant upheld).
Those which narrowed the scope include Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (physical
area subject to search restricted to that within arrestee's "immediate control"); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (lawful arrest alone does not provide basis for warrantless
search); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (exploratory search and seizure of
articles disallowed where arrest was merely pretext for search); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930) (seizure of articles not visible, accessible, or within of-
fender's immediate custody held beyond permissible scope).
1974
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of search is unresponsive to the police officer's need for protection
while making an arrest. Such an argument, however, is no more
valid here than it is in "stop and frisk" situations where the officer
is also restricted in his search. Admittedly, in those instances where
the arrestee is placed in custody, the possibility of an attempted
assault upon the officer exists for a more prolonged period of time
than it would where an officer is merely conducting a "stop and
frisk."54 Even so, a properly conducted frisk55 should detect virtually
all concealed weapons." Since total protection can only be guaran-
teed by a complete sacrifice of the arrestee's fourth amendment
rights, the reasonableness of the intrusion is subject to a balancing
between a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
the police officer's safety in the performance of his duty.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, the vast ma-
jority of courts which had concerned themselves with the problem
had specifically held that, absent "special circumstances," 57 the
54. A person taken into custody may feel more threatened and might resort to force or
violence.
The critical factor in these or similar situations is not the greater likelihood that a
person taken into custody is armed, but rather the increased likelihood of danger to
the officer "if" in fact the person is armed.
People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 214, 496 P.2d 1205, 1225, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 857
(1972) (concurring opinion).
55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968), quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and
Disarming Criminals, 45 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954):
"[Tihe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A
thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back,
the groin and area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the
feet."
56. Ronald Newhouser, an expert in clandestine weaponry and supervisor of the National
Bomb Data Center, testified for the government at the remand hearing. Newhouser removed
from his person 25 concealed weapons that could incapacitate, yet he conceded that a pro-
perly conducted frisk would have detected virtually all of those weapons.
57. The most frequent example of "special circumstances" are those instances where new
information becomes available after the vehicle has been stopped for a motor vehicle viola-
tion. In Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Judge (now Chief Justice)
Burger upheld a warrantless search of a vehicle subsequent to the driver's arrest for driving
with an expired inspection sticker and without a tag light. The court, unanimous in its
opinion, chose not to justify the search as incident to the arrest. It held instead that there
was probable cause to arrest the driver for robbery. During the questioning, but prior to the
search, the police officer's partner heard over the squad car's radio that a person fitting the
driver's general description and driving a similar vehicle had recently committed a robbery.
The search was characterized as evidentiary and upheld.
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lawful arrest for violation of a motor vehicle regulation did not pro-
vide the officer with the right to search either the person or vehicle
incident to the arrest.58
The majority, by denying appellate review of the reasonableness
of the search and upholding the arresting officer's judgment, has
abruptly retreated from the Court's longstanding policy of employ-
ing a case-by-case adjudication as to the reasonableness of a search
and seizure. The majority's desire to hold the arrest itself as the
ultimate justification for the search is to provide an arresting officer
with unrestricted discretion. The potential effect can best be de-
scribed by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v.
Rabinowitz.9 Fearful of the majority's broadened scope of a permis-
sible incidental search, Frankfurter cautioned that such an ap-
proach could make "arrest an incident to an unwarranted search
instead of a warrantless search an incident to an arrest."60 The
Robinson decision represents a giant step toward realization of those
fears.
William L. Steiner
58. See United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1104 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
59. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
60. Id. at 80.
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